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ABSTRACT
SPENCER COCHRAN JOHNS: Sandworms and Computer Worms: An Assessment of
American Critical Infrastructure Cyber Vulnerabilities and the Russian Federation's Growing
Offensive Capabilities

Bottom Line Up Front: It is highly likely that the Russian GRU has the capability,
resources, and intent to execute cyberweapon attacks against American critical infrastructure in
times of heightened tensions, either as a warning or a first strike. I also assess that much of
current American critical infrastructure is not secure enough to withstand a coordinated assault
by the GRU, and very likely has numerous severe vulnerabilities known by the GRU.
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PREFACE
The face of conflict in the world changes with technology. The advent of the gun rendered
the sword obsolete, as did rifling the musket. The First World War existed as a crucible for the
technologies of armed conflict to be refined to a deadly art. The Second World War proved the
power of the airplane, and saw for the first time saw the atom be wielded as a weapon against our
fellow men. The Cold War saw the thermonuclear Sword of Damocles dangled over entire
nations from oceans apart, Mutually Assured Destruction a chilling reminder of how one nation’s
mistakes can doom so many.
The Twenty-First Century has witnessed the incredible rise of computing technology, the
breakneck pace of change often outpacing the security of such developments. Today, it is
impossible to find any facet of modern life that is not affected by a computer, the Internet, or
other digital technologies. Designed with the intent to be a source of knowledge and societal
advancement, the Internet now serves as the fulcrum upon which a skilled actor can push the
status quo in a direction which they desire. As countries like China, North Korea, Russia, and
Iran push autocratic ideologies that attack liberty, democracy, and human rights, it remains vital
that the bedrocks of society, built of digital technologies, as secured against the hostile actors
which aim to destroy these ideals.
Presently, they are not, making the words of Frank Hebert, in his masterwork Dune, so much
more chilling today.
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“Once men turned their thinking over to machines in the hope that this would set
them free. But that only permitted other men with machines to enslave them.”
– Frank Hebert, Dune
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Introduction

As the Russian Federation and the United States of America become embroiled in rising
tensions over espionage, cyberoperations, and Russia’s increasingly direct involvement in
Eastern Europe, the question of how a budding conflict could play out, and what spheres it would
be fought on, has developed an ever-changing answer. Evolutions in technology and doctrine for
both NATO and Russia have resulted in a great grey No-Man’s-Land surrounding the boundaries
of conflict, especially on the digital front. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the realm of
computers has expanded exponentially, enveloping all aspects of life, civilian and military alike.
Routine activities like electricity, banking, and even the availability of clean running water are
reliant on many hundreds of independent, linked critical systems. This infrastructure is spread
across continents and runs from ocean seafloors to geosynchronous orbit, making it the bedrock
of modern like. It is ubiquitous to the current human condition. It is also alarmingly brittle,
insecure, and aging. As conflict between nations becomes increasingly digital, the United States
needs to examine the capabilities of its rival nations, and, equally important, its own weaknesses,
in order to assess how a digital confrontation could be undertaken. This assessment aims to
answer the question, What cyber-vulnerabilities are present in American critical infrastructure,
and how might Russia be able to exploit these vulnerabilities to disrupt critical systems within
the United States? It is broken into two primary sections, a Vulnerability Assessment and a
Threat Assessment. The Vulnerability Assessment examines the known weaknesses of American
critical infrastructure, with emphasis placed on the American power grid, financial sector, and
telecommunications industry. The Threat Assessment examines the GRU, the premier
cyberoperations agency within the Russian Federation’s military, and their known cyberweapon
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capabilities, as well as assessing the thresholds for particular actions against targets and the
potential use of Russian cyberweapons against the United States. The goal in our assessments
was to draw comparisons between historical operations and hypothesized operations, define the
probable thresholds for specific actions by the GRU, and illustrate several potential actions that
could be taken, their dangers, and the weapons that would need to be utilized.
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Chapter I
Vulnerability Assessment of the US Power Grid

On the technical perspective, the United States power grid suffers on many fronts, and
has already had intrusions into systems of critical importance. The American Society of Civil
Engineers, or ASCE, evaluates the state of American critical infrastructure once every four years,
and gives its report in its Report Card for American Infrastructure. In 2017, American energy
infrastructure was given a grade of C-, with emphasis being placed on its rising costs of
maintenance, lack of a nationwide strategy, and growing investment gap1. One of the methods
suggested by the ASCE for improving the American power grid is increased automation, which
it considers to be one of a suite of ‘resilience measures’ that are needed. While the increased
automation will undoubtedly allow for enhanced responses to weather related blackouts and
improved efficiency of power distribution, it opens the grid up to cyberattacks by causing it to
lean even heavier upon the computers running it. Although machine-based management of
critical grid systems has made the management of the grid more efficient, the reliance on
computers for warning signals and readouts means that a competent hostile actor can effectively
hide the present state of the grid during a cyberattack by manipulating the data fed to the control
system.

1

American Society of Civil Engineers. “Energy.” ASCE's 2021 Infrastructure Report Card, March 25, 2021.
https://infrastructurereportcard.org/cat-item/energy/.
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According to the Government Accountability Office, or GAO, a non-partisan government
office which does research for Congress and other agencies, the US power grid does have some
strengths in its security currently. In 2019 the GAO released a review entitled: “Actions Needed
to Address Significant Cybersecurity Risks Facing the Electric Grid”. It reviewed Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) cybersecurity standards, and how they address critical
practices in energy security. On a scale of zero to four, it rates the “identity management,
authentication, and access control” of American power companies as 4/4, the highest possible
score, and “information protection processes and procedures” as 3/4, the second highest score2.
However, it also gives bleak assessments to other parts of the cybersecurity practices. The risk
management strategy of American energy companies was given a 0/4, the lowest possible score,
and vital sectors like data security, maintenance, and protective technology were only given a 2/4
score3. High scoring systems are often localized or specialized, such as the identification and
information protection procedures listed earlier, which are localized to the CAC systems at the
control centers for the power grid. Lower rated systems and strategies, such as risk management,
data security, and maintenance, require long term planning and continual review, both of which
are large consumers of resources. Maintenance takes money, and lots of it, and is often relegated
to systems being fixed only after failure, leading to the investment gap and growing fragility of
the grid. These weaknesses come as America moves to shake its sluggish response to

2

U.S. Government Accountability Office. “Critical Infrastructure Protection: Actions Needed to Address
Significant Cybersecurity Risks Facing the Electric Grid.” Critical Infrastructure Protection: Actions Needed to
Address Significant Cybersecurity Risks Facing the Electric Grid | U.S. GAO. GAO, October 16, 2019.
https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-19-332.
3
U.S. Government Accountability Office. “Critical Infrastructure Protection: Actions Needed to Address
Significant Cybersecurity Risks Facing the Electric Grid.” Critical Infrastructure Protection: Actions Needed to
Address Significant Cybersecurity Risks Facing the Electric Grid | U.S. GAO. GAO, October 16, 2019.
https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-19-332.
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cybersecurity, after a series of high-profile cyberattacks against banks, cities, and the energy
sector shook public confidence in the institution’s capabilities to protect themselves.
The capability to inflict severe virtual, and possibly physical, damage on the American
power grid has been known to exist for some time. Arguably, one could place the Aurora
Generator Test of 2007 as one of the first instances where this danger was realized. Three years
before the United States began the Stuxnet attacks against Iran to hobble their growing nuclear
program by using malicious software to cause enrichment centrifuges to ‘self-destruct’, the Idaho
National Laboratory (INL) of the US Department of Energy exhibited what is regarded to be the
first case of a cyberattack causing physical damage in our world. By manipulating the control
computer of an industrial diesel generator, the INL rapidly oscillated the generator’s circuit
breakers out of phase from the rest of the grid, leading to the internal torque of the engine to
stress the generator’s components to the point of catastrophic failure4. Although stop-gap devices
have been developed to prevent this kind of attack, they have not had universal adoption, due to
increased cost and studies suggesting they may not provide complete protection, leading to
inconsistencies in the grid’s security.

4

Zeller, Mark. “DistribuTECH Conference.” In Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc. San Diego, CA:
Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories, Inc., 2011. https://cmscdn.selinc.com/assets/Literature/Publications/Technical%20Papers/6467_CommonQuestions_MZ_20101209_We
b.pdf?v=20150812-151908. .
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Figure 1 - The six NERC Interconnections (including Quebec)
From - North American Electric Reliability Corporation . A Map of the Six Regional Entities of the North American Power Grid under
NERC Oversight. 2021 Summer Reliability Assessment. NERC, May 2021.
https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC%20SRA%202021.pdf.

This inconsistency is another one of the power grid’s notable weaknesses. The power grid
is divided into three primary interconnections, Eastern, Western, and Texas. The Eastern
Interconnection runs from the Atlantic coast to the western borders of Texas, Nebraska, Kansas,
and the Dakotas, while the Western Interconnection is bordered on the west of this line. The
Eastern and Western Interconnections also reach into Canada, allowing for transnational power
transmission. The Texas Interconnection encompasses most of Texas, save the Panhandle and the
western, northeast, and southeast corners of the state. All three of these Interconnections are
overseen by the North American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), a transnational NGO
which is overseen by FERC and Canadian governmental authorities jointly, in order to
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standardize power transmission across the North American continent. While the Department of
Energy lists minimal standards for the power grid, enforcement is lackluster, and the different
standards formed by states, and often-monopolistic behavior from energy providers, leads to
complacency, a lack of innovation, and a generally aging and insecure grid system as a whole.
The power grid is built on ‘ancient’ technology by computer standards. An example of this are
the communication protocols between industrial equipment. The industry standard is Modbus, a
protocol which was developed in 1979. Despite forming the virtual backbone of plant/system
communication structure between Remote Terminal Units and Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition systems used for CAC purposes in the energy sector, Modbus has no system to
protect against unauthorized commands or data interception5. As a result, other systems must be
implemented on top of Modbus, which in turn may be aging and experiencing vulnerabilities of
their own. Put simply, the power grid is a shambling Frankenstein’s monster of aging technology
and machinery at a nationwide scale, slowly decaying from a lack of investment. The ASCE
estimates that by 2029, if no major changes are made to investment strategy, the investment gap
on major components of the power grid will reach $197 Billion6.
When coupled with the aging infrastructure of the power grid, the cybersecurity
vulnerabilities it faces paint a worrying picture. Networks have been shown to have the potential
to be dangerously brittle, a trait stemming from the fact that a single unknown vulnerability can
have a cascade of effects that can end in unauthorized access, information theft, or destruction.
This brittleness can be seen through the Maersk network’s devastation at the hands of NotPetya.
A single computer in a Ukrainian office was breached, allowing the Trojan to leap from

5

Palmer; Shenoi, Sujeet, eds. (23–25 March 2009). Critical Infrastructure Protection III. Third IFIP WG 11.
10 International Conference. Hanover, New Hampshire: Springer. p. 87. ISBN 3-642-04797-1.
6
American Society of Civil Engineers. “Energy.” ASCE's 2021 Infrastructure Report Card, March 25, 2021.
https://infrastructurereportcard.org/cat-item/energy/.
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computer to computer, crippling the shipping conglomerate’s activities worldwide7. The
existence of BlackEnergy software on American industrial control computers is a worrying
prospect, especially considering the amount of time it went undetected. Such a long period of
incubation before discovery implies strongly that the current security systems are incapable of
monitoring critical systems as necessary as they should be, and supports the GAO’s assessment
that the grid’s data security and protection technology are woefully inadequate, as discussed
previously. In particular, the period of time before discovery indicates that the regulation of files
on a system is not clearly documented or regulated, and that the current software which scan
critical systems for unauthorized files either hasn’t been implemented, or cannot make specific
enough scans to detect sophisticated software like BlackEnergy. ICS-CERT, a division of the
Department of Homeland Security, released a bulletin in December 2014, detailing the existence
of BlackEnergy on an unnumbered amount of industrial control systems hosting HumanMachine Interface (HMI) software. In particular, GE’s Cimplicity was one of the systems
BlackEnergy was specifically tailored to exploit. Analysis placed the earliest existence of
BlackEnergy on US machinery in 2011, and stated that until its discovery in 2014, no offensive
actions had been taken other than reconnaissance. ICS-CERT also stated that modules were
deployed that allowed for lateral movement within the infected environment. A year later, in
December 2015, ICS-CERT quietly updated the top of the report – the same software present on
America CAC machinery was responsible for the first known successful cyberattack on a power
grid in Ukraine, turning off the lights for almost a quarter of a million people and preventing the
delivery of 73 megawatt-hours of power8.

7

Greenberg, Andy. Sandworm. Random House US, 2020.
CISA. “ICS Alert (ICS-Alert-14-281-01E).” CISA. United States Department of Homeland Security, July 22,
2021. https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/alerts/ICS-ALERT-14-281-01B.
8
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In approaching the technical weaknesses of the American power grid, one must be careful
not to take a nihilistic, doom-is-coming perspective of complete devastation and industrial
collapse. Where cyberattacks on critical infrastructure have occurred, duration of disruption is
often measured in hours, rather than days. In addition, America benefits from being in a much
different place in the geopolitical scale than nations like Ukraine. This is due to a host of reasons,
including its much larger military might, distance from Moscow, capability to purse hostile actor
who commit cyberattacks, and the strength of its industry lending to heightened resources to
combat penetrations by hostile actors. That said, it is also far too easy to use this thin comfort as
an excuse for complacency. To ensure the safety of its civilians, economy, and international
prestige, the United States must address these technical weaknesses head on, as soon as it can, to
bring its infrastructure up to and past modern standards in order to mitigate all of these
weaknesses.
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Chapter II
Vulnerability Assessment of the US Financial Sector

The power goes out, the weather changes, but to many Americans, one monolith stood
singular in its enduring nature – America’s financial institutions. The amount of money entrusted
to banks and financial firms within the United States is staggering, currently approximately
$19.17 Trillion in FDIC insured banks9. Just as the December 2015 cyberattacks against Ukraine
was a wide-scale wake up call to the potential of widespread disruption of civilian power grids
by foreign powers utilizing cyber weaponry, the financial world was forced to reckon with the
future of cyberattacks against it when, in February of 2016, thieves attempted to take almost $1
Billion from Bangladesh Bank’s account with the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Suspicious spellings and other red flags resulted in only $101 Million being transferred, to date
of which only $38 Million has been recovered. The attack was conducted by exploiting the
SWIFT network, the worldwide network for executing electronic payment messages10. While
this attack brought to the forefront the vulnerabilities of international financial institutions to
cyberattacks, the response has been stymied due to the nature of SWIFT as an international
cooperative, with changes being debated by a host of banks from dozens of different countries.

9

FDIC, FDIC: Quarterly Banking Profile - December 31, 2021 § (2022).
https://www.fdic.gov/analysis/quarterly-banking-profile/.
10
O'Grady, Jim, and Kenny Malone. “A SWIFT Getaway.” NPR. NPR, February 10, 2022.
https://www.npr.org/2022/02/09/1079528331/a-swift-getaway.
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Although organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Financial
Stability Board (FSB) have sounded the alarm, it is ultimately up to countries and companies to
contain the potential for damage. This effort to prevent and respond has suffered from a lack
unified leadership, as all parties look to others to take the throne of responsibility of ensuring the
integrity of the global financial system.
The growing threat of cyberattacks against the financial system comes at a time of
transformation for banking and finances worldwide, onset by the embracing of digital technology
and accelerated by the outbreak of COVID-19. One such example of financial transformation is
the consideration of creating Central Bank Digital Currency, or CBDC. CBDC has been publicly
discussed by the Federal Reserve as recently as January 20, 2020, when the Federal Reserve
released a paper evaluating the pros and cons of implementing a CBDC system. While this
technology has the potential to revolutionize how the US Dollar is spent, used, and stored, it is
also reliant on a secure system to be implemented on, something that attacks against financial
institutions have proven to be more difficult in practice than theory.
To date a majority of cyberattacks against financial systems have been in the forms of
theft, both by individual criminals and state-sponsored actors. North Korea, for instance, is
estimated to have stolen approximately $2 Billion from around the world using various forms of
cyber theft since its efforts began. The methods North Korea has utilized include the theft of
credentials of both cryptocurrency exchanges and financial institutions, as well as ransomware
payments, methods that have all been used effectively against systems in the United States11.
Cybercrime is just one of many illicit activities the nation relies on, in addition to smuggling of
precious materials and weapons, illegal shipping, and counterfeiting, in an effort to circumvent
11

United Nations, United Nations Security Council. Report of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to
resolution 1874 (2009). New York, NY: UN Headquarters, 2019.
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the international sanctions brought down upon it and fuel its programs for the development of
weapons of mass destruction12. In just the United States, the FBI estimates that $4.2 Billion was
stolen in just 2020 through cybercrime and fraud13, and the IMF estimates that financial
institutions have lost over $100 Billion total to cyberattacks14. These attacks are not just against
the average American citizen, but are increasingly growing more sophisticated and are targeting
investment firms, banks, and other critical institutions on Wall Street and beyond. However, the
growing danger of cyberattacks against financial institutions is not theft, but, like attacks against
the power grids, widespread disruption and potential destruction.
On March 24, 2016, the Department of Justice unsealed indictments of seven Iranians
who had worked with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps to repeatedly bombard forty-six
of America’s largest financial institutions with Distributed Denial of Service, or DDoS, attacks
for 176 days, cutting off their capability to service customers for swaths of time beginning in
December 2011 and continuing through 2012, and causing “tens of millions of dollars being
spent by the companies trying to stay online through these attack”, according to U.S. Attorney
Preet Bharara of the Southern District of New York15. In addition, the seven Iranians gained
access to the SCADA architecture of the Bowman Avenue Dam, although no malicious action
was taken with that compromised access. These DDoS attacks showed a willingness for

12

Frank, Ruediger, Sangsoo Lee, and Robert Carlin and Rachel Minyoung Lee. “North Korea's Illicit Cyber
Operations: What Can Be Done? - 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea.” 38 North, February 28, 2020.
https://www.38north.org/2020/02/skleineahlbrandt022820/.
13
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “Timeline of Cyber Incidents Involving Financial
Institutions.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2022.
https://carnegieendowment.org/specialprojects/protectingfinancialstability/timeline#click-hide.
14
Bernard, Stan. “Financial Services Are at Risk of Cyber Attacks: Zurich Insurance.” Future of Risk. Zurich
Insurance, May 28, 2021. https://insights.zurichna.com/financial-services-firms-have-a-lot-to-lose-from-a-cyberattack.
15
“Seven Iranians Working for Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Affiliated Entities Charged for
Conducting Coordinated Campaign of Cyber Attacks Against U.S. Financial Sector.” Justice News. The United States
Department of Justice, March 24, 2016. United States of America. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/seven-iraniansworking-islamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-affiliated-entities-charged.
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adversaries to move beyond theft and fraud of financial institutions towards aggressive,
disruptive maneuvers. DDoS attacks require hundreds, if not thousands, of computers to
simultaneously bombard systems with requests for information, crushing the receiving system
under a tsunami of data packets. Since the 2012 DDoS attacks, a new form of cyberattack
emerged as the favorite for destructive attacks against financial firms – ransomware.
According to IBM’s Security X-Force, ransomware has emerged as the most common
type of cyberattack targets are likely to suffer from, comprising 23% of all cyberattacks
evaluated in 202016. Financial institutions are particularly vulnerable to ransomware attacks, and
their aftereffects, because of how their services are rendered. Analysis from insurance firm
Zurich describes the differences between an attack against a pipeline, like Colonial Pipeline,
brought down in May 2021 by a ransomware attack, and a financial institution – “A pipeline
disabled by a ransomware attack may see through-put interrupted for a few days but is not likely
to suffer long-term reputational damage and loss of customer confidence once service is restored.
Will customers… unable to withdraw or move funds due to a ransomware event ever again have
the same degree of confidence in the institution?”17. Such a collapse of confidence and customers
can devastate a financial institution, the bedrock of whose enterprise is trust, as well as bring
upon it the ire of regulatory agencies. The collective burden laid upon a compromised financial
institution is not outside of the realm of stress of causing a failure, bankruptcy, or envelopment
by another firm with more integral trust.

16

IBM. “X-Force Threat Intelligence Index 2022.” IBM Security X-Force Threat Intelligence Index. IBM,
February 23, 2022. https://www.ibm.com/security/data-breach/threat-intelligence/.
17

Bernard, Stan. “Financial Services Are at Risk of Cyber Attacks: Zurich Insurance.” Future of Risk. Zurich
Insurance, May 28, 2021. https://insights.zurichna.com/financial-services-firms-have-a-lot-to-lose-from-a-cyberattack.
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On a larger scale, a ransomware attack against a financial institution which ends in the
deletion of critical data at a custodial bank or a central security depository will have a ripple of
impacts through the financial web. First and foremost, it would bring a critical player to its knees
with an outage, directly leading to an inability of settle transactions on a mass scale. In addition,
such a failure of security would lead to the eroded integrity and efficiency of the global financial
system, as well as a widespread loss of trust. According to Oliver Wyman, an American
management consulting firm, these collective impacts have to potential to lead to a credit and
liquidity crisis, in which liquid money and extended credit may be unavailable to clients for a
period of time18. The knowledge that a failing firm’s rotting trunk may bring down other,
healthier firms as it falls is widespread, as Oliver Wyman notes in its report – “Given the
potential for significant cascading and contagion effects, payments, clearing and/or settlement
firms have built-in redundancies to ensure the potential impact of the failure of any single
systemically important institution on the system can be mitigated”19. This network of
redundancies is not foolproof, however. In particular, the redundancy mechanisms incorporated
by individual firms could buckle under the weight of numerous attacks distributed across
multiple firms simultaneously, creating a cascade of dangerous energy potential across the global
financial field.
American financial institutions form the backbone of the American economy, enabling
her infrastructure, manufacturing capabilities, and all other forms of business which her people

18

Oliver Wyman. “Large-Scale Cyber-Attacks on the Financial System.” Oliver Wyman Publications. Oliver
Wyman, March 2018. https://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliverwyman/v2/publications/2018/march/Large-Scale-Cyber-Attacks-DTCC-2018.pdf.
19
Oliver Wyman. “Large-Scale Cyber-Attacks on the Financial System.” Oliver Wyman Publications. Oliver
Wyman, March 2018. https://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliverwyman/v2/publications/2018/march/Large-Scale-Cyber-Attacks-DTCC-2018.pdf.
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undertake. As such, it is vital that this backbone remain strong and upright, as without it all other
aspects of the economy suffer. Although the financial sector has had more success in
modernization security efforts than the power grid, in part due to the potential of dissolution or
bankruptcy if it fails in its trust to customers, financial firms continue to have a massive target on
their back, aimed at by criminals and antagonistic foreign powers alike. As such, it remains of
the utmost priority that the American financial sector continues to reinforce its cybersecurity in
order to prevent the potentially catastrophic impacts of a widespread failure.

15

Chapter III
Vulnerability Assessment of the US Telecommunications Sector

Backing up all of this critical infrastructure, from finances to power and everything in
between, are the telecom services and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) who manage the services
which facilitate these conversations. Secure and time-efficient delivery of digital
communications is dependent on ISP infrastructure. Tech goliaths, like Amazon, host much of
this information in massive server farms, all spread across the world, which collectively help
form “the Cloud”, a cornerstone of modern computing infrastructure and an extremely ripe target
for bad actors hoping to cause mass disruption and chaos by cyberattacks. In February 2020,
Amazon Web Services (AWS), Amazon’s cloud computing and web service branch which hosts
almost a third of all cloud services worldwide, was disrupted by a Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attack, taking it and large portions of the internet offline for some time. At the time, it
was the largest publicly reported DDoS attack ever launched, and continued for three days,
although outages did not continue for the entire duration of the attack. Furthermore, large denial
of service attacks against the internet’s core infrastructure are increasingly committed not only
by criminal individuals, but also by nation states.

16

In September 2021, two UK-based Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) providers were
hit with concurrent DDoS attacks, bringing both offline20. VOIP provides a means by which to
deliver high-fidelity audio files with as low as possible degradation over the internet at high
speeds, and is often combined with video capabilities for services like Skype and Zoom. In
addition, VOIP is used by digital phone networks that have replaced localized landline systems
in large offices. However, for VOIP to function, it must pass through an intermediary, like all
other internet service. The attacks against VoIP Unlimited and Voipfone were ultimately
attributed to REvil, a Russian cybercrime gang who, prior to their sudden dismantlement by
Russian law enforcement, were suspected of working extensively with the Kremlin21.
One of the most destructive examples of criminal denial of service is the Mirai botnet, a
massive conglomeration of infected Internet of Things (IoT) devices and computers created and
utilized by open-source malware unleashed in 2016. Initially developed as part of a protection
racket involving disrupting Minecraft servers and then offering protection payments in return for
a cessation of attacks, Mirai, which takes its name from the Japanese word for “future”,
eventually became involved in three large, well known cyberattacks. The first was against
prominent security blogger Brian Krebs, in an attack that sat at a respectable 620 gigabytes per
second, a fourth of the record-setting AWS attack. Shortly thereafter, Mirai was turned against
an ISP for the first time, successfully hitting French hosting site OVH with a 1 terabyte per
second attack. However, Mirai’s most infamous attack came shortly after both of these attacks,
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where it was used to attack Dyn, a domain name service (DNS) provider, who is responsible for
assisting in routing internet traffic to its intended destination. Dyn was overwhelmed in a 1.5
terabyte per second deluge, also at the time the largest volume ever seen, and quickly failed. The
following map, provided by utility monitor DownDetector, shows the location and severity of
internet outages caused by Dyn’s collapse. PayPal, Netflix, HBO, Twitter, and other large
websites were rendered inaccessible by the attack, and spent the day off the internet22.

Figure 2 - A map of internet outages in Europe and North America caused by the Dyn cyberattack October 21, 2016.
From - DownDetector. Level3 Outage Map (US) - 21 October 2016.Png. Wikimedia. DownDetector, October 21, 2016.
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Level3_Outage_Map_(US)_-_21_October_2016.png.

Dyn’s failure was many in a long line of ISPs and web utility hosts being attacked by
DDoS. In fact, the first DDoS attack ever recorded came against Panix, New York’s oldest ISP,
in 1996. Using an attacked called a Syn Flood, in which the ISP is inundated by numerous badfaith requests to connect per second, Panix was taken offline for 36 hours, and marked the
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starting point for the inauspicious history of denial of service attacks23. Subsequent attacks using
Mirai have been attributed with the temporary collapse of the internet infrastructure of Liberia in
November 201624.
State-sponsored actors using DDoS attacks is nothing new. Authoritarian states have
utilized DDoS attacks to quash dissent from outside their own borders, either bringing down
entire social media sites to smother growing conversation or having targeted attacks deployed
against blogs of prominent dissenters. State sponsored DDoS attacks against ISPs themselves
have come to be a recent, but powerful and dangerous, development. Google was subjected to a
six-month long campaign of ineffectual DDoS attacks which it assesses to originate from
Chinese state computers in 2017, topped off with the largest DDoS attack recorded ever – a 2.5
terabyte per second behemoth which more than doubled the previous record holder, and served
as a testament to what state actors like China or Russia could conduct against the United States
when focusing their resources25. Google remained tight lipped publicly about the attack,
appending a note about it to the bottom of a post regarding election security, writing a two
paragraph note which summarized the attack, then noted, “Addressing state-sponsored DDoS
attacks requires a coordinated response from the internet community, and we work with others to
identify and dismantle infrastructure used to conduct attacks”26.
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Much like the financial sector, the last five years have witnessed the rise of ransomware
attacks against telecom and ISPs. Verizon noted that in 2017, the rate of ransomware attacks
against telecom institutions were up 50% from 2016, a trend which that has accelerated since
then27. Ransomware has proven to be a brutally effective method of cyberattack against all
institutions, and that goes doubly so for telecom, where the maintenance of critical data and
communication tables is vital to the telecom service’s continued existence.
This existential threat is a prime motivator for growth of ransomware against telecom
services, as in many cases the victim is left with no choice but to pay the demand. While few
instances of successful ransomware attacks against telecom exist, the post child example for how
devastating one attack can be arrived in one of its first instances. On July 18, 2021, Telecom
Argentina, one of South American’s largest telecom providers, was hit by a ransomware attack
which, once delivered through a compromised Domain Admin account, encrypted 18,000
workstations for the service provider, with demands posted for a $7.5 million ransom, one of the
largest sums demanded in such an attack28. It should be noted that at first glance, many
ransomware attacks seem to demand potentially lower-than-expected ransoms, but a key part of
the attack is the cost-benefit balance for paying the ransom. A ransom must be low enough for it
to be noticeably less expensive for the victim to just pay for the damages to be unencrypted,
rather than by replacing all machines and data and writing off their losses. REvil was named the
perpetrators of this attack. Earlier in the year, REvil pulled off a similar attack against Sri Lanka
Telecom, Sri Lanka’s largest telephone provider.
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State actors are increasingly adding ransomware to their repertoire as well, even if they
are not publicly showing this strength. Iranian state-sponsored group Lyceum spend the summer
of 2021 in a hacking spree, attacking telecom, oil and gas, and ISP companies in Israel, Saudi
Arabia, Morocco, and Tunisia. While these attacks did not utilize ransomware, they did use a
form of DNS tunneller which created a backdoor into the victim’s systems29. Such a backdoor
provides the perfect entryway for ransomware deployment, as ransomware is often bundled with
Trojan software or is embedded inside infected files for effective deployment. Even more
dangerously, an effective backdoor would allow the theft of files before their destruction or
encryption, allowing state actors to surveil potential future targets using a system’s implied
blueprints.
Finally, state-actors are increasingly interested in attacking telecoms not for destructive
purpose, but instead for data theft. Harvester, an organization assessed to be a nation-state actor,
but not with enough confidence to name a specific state, has been silently moving through South
Asian telecom services with tailor-made backdoors and other specialized software. Many of its
attacks occurred within Afghanistan, and utilized a custom backdoor named Graphon30.
Afghanistan is a soft target in terms of cybersecurity, frequently wracked with instability and
violence, which gives one potential explanation for this action, which is that Harvester is testing
its tools out and refining them for future action against a harder target. Other prominent data
theft attacks by state sponsored actors include DNS hijackings, which have been conducted by
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Iran, Russia, and China in the last three years31. DNS, as described earlier, can be viewed as the
internet’s GPS, a directory and navigation protocol which ensures data is delivered as necessary
to its recipient. DNS hijacking involves rerouting data packets to the attacker’s address, allowing
them to steal and potentially view this information. The intercepted data can also be sensitive
data, including authentication information, which can lead to potential further actions, including
the previously discussed DDoS and ransomware attacks.

31

De Lucia, Emanuele. “Apt vs Internet Service Providers – a Threat Hunter's Perspective.” Virus Bulletin ::
APT vs Internet service providers – a threat hunter's perspective. Virus Bulletin, 2019.
https://www.virusbulletin.com/virusbulletin/2020/10/apt-vs-internet-service-providers-threat-huntersperspective/.

22

Chapter IV
The Rise of Russian Cyberwarfare - A History of the GRU and Its Actions

Figure 3 - The Emblem of the GRU
From - Bowen, Andrew S., Russian Military Intelligence: Background and Issues for Congress § (2021).
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/intel/R46616.pdf.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the late Twentieth Century left behind two very
major things – a global geopolitical power vacuum, and a surplus of military hardware,
infrastructure, and supporting agencies for the newly formed Russian Federation to reorganize
after the dissolution of the Red Army. While institutions like the Northern Fleet would suffer,
most notably through the disaster of the Kursk’s loss with all hands during a training exercise,
other institutions simply continued to exist as they had through the duration of the Soviet regime.
One such institution was the GRU. Founded in 1918 as the Main Intelligence Directorate (also
abbreviated as GRU) under Leon Trotsky himself, the Soviet GRU was renamed the Main
Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation
(formally abbreviated G.R.U., but colloquially still using the Soviet-era GRU title) following the
23

Soviet breakup. During the Soviet Union’s existence, the GRU was a fierce rival of the KGB,
similarly but even more virulent than the FBI-CIA rivalry that complicated American
intelligence during the Cold War. In fact, the GRU was noted for being the most independent of
the Soviet intelligence and espionage agencies, answering the head of the Soviet Armed Forces,
rather than to the Soviet Premier. As a Soviet agency, the GRU’s mission was primarily in
gathering military intelligence, akin to the DIA, although it also participated in general
intelligence32.
Following the dissolution of the KGB after the August Coup, the GRU entered the
Russian Federation as one of the only remaining vestiges of Soviet intelligence. This would not
last, however, as following the underperformance of the Russian military during the invasion of
Georgia, the GRU was labelled as a scapegoat for providing faulty intelligence33. In 2009, the
head of the GRU, who had served since 1997, was removed from his position and replaced by
his deputy. The next year, plans were made for the GRU to surrender the Spetsnaz brigades it
had operated for decades to the Russian Army’s commanders. This action was extremely
significant, and led to the GRU looking for its new identity, although, due to bureaucratic
hurdles, the brigades were never reassigned. In 2011, the GRU was downsized by over 1000
officers, its intelligence operations were reduced, and a new head was appointed – Igor Sergun.
Between all of these actions, it was rumored that there was a plan to downgrade the GRU from
Main Directorate to Directorate, a serious demotion that would have removed “influence,
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autonomy, and political importance”34. This never occurred, and following the appointment of
Sergun to the GRU’s head, the agency began to recover from the Georgian War’s shadow.
Under Sergun, the GRU emphasized the ability to conduct what it referred to as “active
measures”. These operations include aggressive and sensitive actions like assassinations,
political interference, and, as the GRU came to realize in the early 2010s, cyber operations
against foreign nations35. It engaged in many of these operations, with great effect and notoriety,
before the end of the decade, including manufacturing large amounts of disinformation to
influence the 2016 US Presidential Elections. In 2018, GRU agents were implicated in the
globally-reported attempted assassination of former GRU agent turned UK spy Sergei Skripal
with the nerve agent Novichuk in the city of Salisbury, UK. As all of this happened, the GRU
was also sharpening its teeth in the field of offensive and destructive cyber operations, pushing
the envelope of what the world had seen before.
In the last decade, the GRU has become experts at state sponsored cyberattacks targeting
critical infrastructure. In that time, two GRU units have risen to notoriety - GRU Unit 26165,
known most commonly by the alias of ‘Fancy Bear’, and GRU Unit 74455, named ‘Sandworm’
due to references to Dune by Frank Hebert in their code36. Fancy Bear, named by a coding
system developed by CrowdStrike, gained notoriety for hacking the DNC leading up to the 2016
election, but also has been identified for attacking elections in NATO countries, notably France
in 2017, the International Olympic Committee, and Western defense contractors37. The following
34
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diagram illustrates the intrusion methods Fancy Bear (APT 28) and FSB sister unit Cozy Bear
(APT 29) have refined during the time of their operations.

Figure 4 - The tactics and techniques used by APT29 and APT 28 to conduct cyber intrusions against target systems
From: Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, CISA, and FBI, JAR-16-20296A: GRIZZLY STEPPE
– Russian Malicious Cyber Activity § (2016). https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/sites/default/files/publications/JAR_16-20296A_GRIZZLY%20STEPPE2016-1229.pdf.

Sandworm, on the other hand, honed their skills against Ukraine, using the war-torn
nation as a development sandbox to test new methods and cyberweapons. Since the War in
Donbas began, Russia has been intensely meddling in it, providing a vast amount of men,
material, and support to the war before the formal Russian invasion in February of 2022. Some
of this support has taken the form of extensive cyberattacks, often deployed by Sandworm.
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Sandworm’s two most notable attacks in the region are the December 23, 2015 Ukraine Power
Grid Attack and NotPetya38.
The December 2015 attack utilized a modular hacking tool named BlackEnergy, a nowstandard tool for Sandworm, designed for attacking critical infrastructure and seizing control of
CAC systems. BlackEnergy is a modular Trojan malware which includes keyloggers, monitoring
and access files, and system destruction utilities. Initially designed as a cybercrime tool,
Sandworm added remote access and ICS targeting tools, allowing it to inflict real world damage
by manipulating control systems of sensitive infrastructure. It is initially deployed through
phishing attacks, often by means of an infected Word or PowerPoint document. BlackEnergy has
also been repeatedly developed, with each new version being almost entirely recoded from the
ground up, gaining sophistication, power, and simplicity with each iteration. The latest version of
BlackEnergy, BlackEnergy3, also referred to as BE3, includes an elegant series of .dll files, each
which run a single task after being prompted. These plug-in .dll files can be installed at different
points in time, and are run through a driver file, disguised as a time-stamped log file. This
partial-installation capability was utilized when BlackEnergy was installed on American
systems, when the GRU elected to not place the destructive files on the system at the time of
installation, a notable expression of restraint by the intelligence agency. Each of these plug-ins
provides a different function to the malware, including proliferation of the infection, espionage
tools, and methods to facilitate a takeover of the infected system, and are likely installed in such
an order. Combined, these tools create an extremely potent, compact, and dangerous
cyberweapon, with scalable yield, is an all-in-one tool for infiltration, espionage, and mission
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execution. A full list of the capabilities provided by the plug-ins according to the security firm
McAfee, as well as their names, are as follows:
•

fs.dll — File system operations

•

si.dll — System information, “BlackEnergy Lite”

•

jn.dll — Parasitic infector

•

ki.dll — Keylogger

•

ps.dll — Password stealer

•

ss.dll — Screenshots

•

vs.dll — Network discovery, remote execution

•

tv.dll — Team viewer

•

rd.dll — Simple pseudo “remote desktop”

•

up.dll — Update malware

•

dc.dll — List Windows accounts

•

bs.dll — Query system hardware, BIOS, and Windows info

•

dstr.dll — Destroy system

•

scan.dll — Network scan39
NotPetya, on the other hand, is an exclusively destructive malware named for its

similarity to the Petya ransomware. Propagated through an infected update of the Ukrainian tax
audit tool M.E.Doc, NotPetya spread through computer systems due to access control seizure
tools, stealing account logins and hopscotching across borders and software systems, dealing
over $10 Billion in damage collective, including $300 Million to shipping conglomerate Maersk,

39

Samani, Raj. “Updated BlackEnergy Trojan Grows More Powerful.” Web log. McAfee Blog (blog).
McAfee, January 14, 2016. https://www.mcafee.com/blogs/other-blogs/mcafee-labs/updated-blackenergy-trojangrows-more-powerful/.

28

whose system was compromised by a single computer in a Ukrainian subsidiary office, and $400
Million to FedEx through European subsidiaries. Worldwide, both malware systems have caused
disruption since their emergence, causing billions of dollars of damage collectively, although
Ukraine remains the only nation to have its lights turned off by BlackEnergy. However, elements
of BlackEnergy, including foundations for its infiltration and deployment tools, have been found
in components of the US power grid as early as 201140.
Fundamentally, Russia likely views the GRU’s hacks as a grey area of war and
geopolitical struggle, a region where they can meddle and interfere to a certain degree with the
plausible deniability behind cyberattacks and the ability to ask, are these actions really worth a
conventional war? That is the key idea behind Russia’s assessment of the use of cyberweapons.
If Russia military forces had set foot in the United States in 2016 and interfered with the
Presidential election, that action would have been, without a doubt, an act of war and a violation
of American sovereignty. However, is it still the same case if these actions are taken while
wearing an online mask, pretending to be Americans, while making influential hacks and
disinformation campaigns from Russian territory? Thus far, the answer appears to be no. While
the FBI did indict a dozen GRU agents over the DNC hack, the extent of American response and
reprisal against the GRU and Russia has largely been limited to indictments such as these, with
trials likely never to occur due to Russia’s refusal to extradite its own military personnel for trial
in the United States, a decision surprising to no one involved41.
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Based on their previous operations, and the confidence entrusted to them by Putin and
senior military leadership, I assess that the GRU and its specialized units will continue to
constitute an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), an assessment given to its units Sandworm
(designated APT Sandworm) and Fancy Bear (designated APT 28) by FireEye, a cybersecurity
firm who tracks APTs42. This assessment indicates that the GRU’s cyberwarfare units constitute
a real, clear, and present danger to the industrial, military, and governmental information security
of America, NATO members, and other countries which Russia views as geopolitical rivals. In
addition, units such as Unit 54777, also known as the 72nd Special Service Center, have
developed capabilities to organize and disseminate mass disinformation campaigns, such as those
seen during the 2016 American Presidential election43. While not designated an APT, Unit 54777
and similar units within the GRU and the Russian intelligence community present a continuous
threat to American national security due to their capability to influence public opinion and policy
through disinformation and propaganda campaigns.
To understand how the GRU engages in cyberwarfare, it is important to understand the
tools and weapons it has at its disposal. To do so, we have divided their previously utilized tools
and cyberweapons into four broad subcategories, the name, description, and effectiveness of
which is as follows:
1. Disruptive Cyberweapons – The bread and butter of cyberwarfare, disruptive
cyberweapons are designed to interrupt communications and services to and from a
target. These have been utilized frequently by the GRU, most recently during the Russian
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invasion of Ukraine on February 23, 2022. According to Bellingcat, at 16:30 Kyiv time
on February 23, following a speech two days earlier from Vladimir Putin in which he
recognized the independence of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR)
and Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR), the websites of the Ukrainian Parliament,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Council of Ministers were brought down by a DDoS
attack. Further investigation by Bellingcat indicates that resources involved in the attack
were the same as ones utilized in 2021 against Ukraine and Georgia, which themselves
were linked the Fancy Bear44. I assess that these Disruptive cyberweapons constitute the
most commonly utilized tools in the GRU’s inventory, and that their success varies based
on the target and intent. For example, the February 23 attack brought most targeted
websites offline for two hours. However, other DDoS attacks can endure for up to and
over a day, depending on target infrastructure, techniques utilized, and levels of
preparedness by the victim. As such, these weapons have a moderate to high level of
effectiveness, a high level of utilization, but a low to moderate level total impact. These
attacks are also not exclusive to APTs, and can be utilized for internet vandalism and
criminal extortion schemes, but those conducted by APTs often have higher degrees of
effectiveness and refined methodology.
2. Unauthorized Control Cyberweapons – These cyberweapons are typically tailor-made
for specific targets, often critical infrastructure, and as such are usually utilized by APTs.
Prime examples of cyberweapons designed to grant unauthorized control of a secure
systems are BlackEnergy, and their use in the December 23, 2015 attacks against
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Ukrainian critical infrastructure, discussed previously in this report, and Stuxnet, used by
American and Israeli intelligence services to destroy nuclear enrichment centrifuges
within Iran’s nuclear facility at Natanz45. These weapons are almost exclusive to statesponsored actors, due to their complexity and lack of economic returns for interested
cybercriminals. I assess that these weapons have a very high level of effectiveness, a low
level of utilization, and a very high impact on targets.
3. Information Extraction Cyberweapons – Cyberweapons of this designed are tailored
for espionage, bypassing security protocols and stealing credentials. These tools are often
combined with others or are integrated into them, to increase impact. For instance,
NotPetya contains two separate measures of stealing or bypassing credential checks. In
addition, this category contains tools designed to exfiltrate documents from a system.
Fancy Bear utilized such a tool, named X-Tunnel, to steal thousands of documents from
the DNC in 2016, as outlined in the Dept. of Justice’s indictment of the twelve members
of Fancy Bear who carried out the attack46. I assess that the GRU’s information
extraction tools have a very high level of effectiveness, utilization, and impact. The GRU
utilizes these tools frequently and to high effect, many times without recognition that an
attack has taken place until documents are disseminated publicly.
4. Destructive Cyberweapons – The crown jewel of the GRU’s available weapons, and the
ones most akin to traditional weapons, are destructive malware. Typically, these function
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by encrypting a computer’s storage disk with high-level encryption schemes like SHA,
AES or RSA, which include computationally impossible keys (brute forcing a 256-bit
key, the current standard, involves the evaluation of trillions of individual keys, and takes
time in the magnitude of decades). By encrypting a computer’s entire hard drive, an
attacker can effectively destroy all information on the machine in an efficient and
permanent measure. NotPetya included information extraction tools coupled with
destructive methodology, creating an efficient destructive cyberweapon capable of selfpropagation, and subsequent destructions, of entire computer networks with relative ease.
On a fundamental level, NotPetya is as close to a nuclear-level cyberweapon as the world
has ever seen.
If we would make a comparison to traditional weapons, if Stuxnet is a precision
guided munition, NotPetya is the digital equivalent of the Blitz or carpet bombing, a
massive air raid with no distinction between military targets and civilian
infrastructure.
As such, I assess that cyberweapons of NotPetya’s scale have an extremely high level of
effectiveness, a low level of utilization due to their dangerously aggressive nature, and an
extremely high level of impact for victims. However, destructive cyberweapons of a lesser scale,
such as ransomware, are assessed to have an extremely high level of effectiveness, a moderate
level of utilization, and a high level of impact for victims, trading mass destructive capability for
the ability to use the weapon without attractive worldwide attention.
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Chapter V
An Assessment of the GRU’s Thresholds for Action and the Rationale Behind Attacks

When examining the history of the GRU’s cyberoperations, it is apparent that the nation
an attack is taking place in and the geographic location of said nation is very important in the
planning of such an attack. For instance, while BlackEnergy was found on American critical
infrastructure, it was notably lacking several files critical to the attack process. It was,
metaphorically, an unloaded gun without a firing pin, capable of being turned into an active
threat with little turnaround, but in the present moment not capable of harm47. The present files
could be actively weaponized for information espionage, indicating that the operation was likely
still in the scouting phase of deployment, and that the GRU was taking care not to accidentally
cause harm with premature deployment and activation of attack files. However, the absent .dll
files involved in takeover and attack could be installed fairly easily, however, once BlackEnergy
is present on a system, meaning that BlackEnergy’s existence on American critical infrastructure
is not a hollow threat. Considering that BlackEnergy had been placed as early as 2011 on
American systems, this indicates a high level of restraint and discipline amongst the GRU’s
agents. American infrastructure, however, occupies a uniquely safe haven when examining
Russia’s history of cyberattacks, thanks in part due America’s capability for equivalent reprisal
and how Russia has used cyberattacks to increase localized pressure to advance its national
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security agenda. Other nations which do not benefit from this safety often sit in Eastern Europe,
former Soviet vestiges which Putin likely views as being rightful Russian possessions. In
addition, the threshold for Russia to view cyberattack initiation has been shown to be remarkably
low, both for GRU operations and implicitly supported ‘cyber mafia’ operations.
In 2007, the small Baltic nation of Estonia woke up to its internet crippled. The nation
had recently announced it was going to relocate a Soviet war memorial and tombs of Soviet
soldiers who died in the Second World War. Within days, waves of DDoS attacks washed over
Estonia, bringing the websites of the government, banks, newspapers, and broadcasters down in
a massive crash. These cyberattacks accompanied fatal riots in the city of Tallinn, where the
statue, called the Bronze Soldier, was located. In Moscow, Russians besieged the Estonian
embassy, as the Russian government decried the action, calling the choice inhumane and
sacrilegious48. Estonia countered with their reasoning for the move, stating that the statue
attracted pro-Soviet Russian nationalists and that the statue, and the remains buried with it,
belonged in a proper cemetery instead of a city center. Eventually, the statue was moved, and, in
time, the cyberattacks abated. Although NATO and Estonia adamantly pointed fingers toward
the Russian government, further investigation ultimately revealed no evidence that Russia itself
had participated in the attacks.
The Estonian attacks present an opportunity to briefly discuss another method the
Russian government uses to conduct cyberattacks with plausible deniability – the courtship of
cybercriminals. In Estonia, the Russian government looked the other way as cybercriminals
within its borders bombarded the nation with attacks, providing silent, implied encouragement
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and support, especially in its refusal to investigate and arrest those responsible, an unwritten
policy which has remained in place during the conflict in Ukraine started in 2014, according to
the Carnegie Endowment49. In addition, the Endowment notes, Russian intelligence and security
branches, namely the FSB, have worked extensively with cybercriminals, often in a quid pro quo
arrangement. For instance, Alexsey Alexseyevich Belan, a Russian cybercriminal who returned
to Russia before an Interpol Red Notice could lead to his extradition, worked with the FSB, the
Russian Federation’s successor to the infamous KGB. Belan, along with numerous other
unknown cybercriminals, assisted in two data breaches at Yahoo!, the first of which
compromised 500 million email accounts, and the second which compromised over 1 billion
email accounts50. In return, the FSB and other Russian authorities turned a blind eye to Belan and
other criminals using the compromised information to steal other critical data and financial
details so they could personally profit. Despite numerous reports of its cooperation with
cybercriminals, Russia officially denies it occurs, but continues to ignore arrest and extradition
requests, and frequently attempts to interfere with or complicate trials, arrests, and extraditions of
those which is had under-the-table deals with51.
These ‘cyber mafia’ attacks often occur within the realm of former Soviet territories. The
Tallinn Soldier attacks are one in a long series of cyberattacks which have occurred with
Moscow’s implicit approval, often with impactful geopolitical impacts. Shortly after Estonia, the
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nation of Lithuania outlawed Soviet iconography, an action which was quickly followed by
hackers traced to Russia defacing government websites with the Hammer and Sycle. In January
of 2009, the ‘cyber militia’, as the group is also referred to, succeeded in bringing down two of
Kyrgyzstan’s main ISPs, strangling over 80% of the nation’s bandwidth. At the time, Moscow
had been pressuring the younger, post-revolution government to evict the United States from an
airbase at Manas, stoking tensions already high off a shooting of a local by a base guard and
questions over how much rent the United States was paying for the vital supply base, which
helped facilitate operations over Afghanistan. Within six months of the cyberattacks, an
overwhelming vote in the Kyrgyz parliament, with only one dissenting vote, resulted in the US
dismantling its base in Manas by the end of the year, although a later arrangement allowed the
US to maintain a non-militarized, small-scale transport facility at a civilian airbase at triple the
previous rent.52 Three months later, the cyber mafia turned on Kyrgyzstan, bringing down a
media outlet which published a statement critical of Russia which had been made by the same
president of Kyrgyzstan who oversaw the American eviction. Coupled with the extensive silently
condoned attacks against Ukraine that have been occurring for nearly eight years, it is apparent
that the cyber militia is being used as a pseudo-disaffiliated element of the Russian’s official
cyber capabilities, utilizing their own resources to attack targets that have stymied themselves in
Russia’s strategic glare.
The existence of the cyber militia answers an important question when examining how
Russia deploys it cybercapabilites – why is so little of it directed towards the United States? The
answer is that it doesn’t need to, and that to do so would represent a dangerous escalation of
tensions between the United States. More often than not, any strategic measure which Russia
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hopes to achieve with the United States would suffer, rather than benefit, from the deployment of
any cyberweapon, especially one of NotPetya’s capabilities. Currently, a majority of the
cyberweapon deployment done by the GRU is done in Eastern Europe, coinciding with where
Russia believes it can operate with relative impunity. In addition, these are the territories that
Russia wants to either incorporate into its official territories or into its sphere of influence and
away from NATO’s. Ukraine, for instance, has remained a hotbed of Russian cyberwarfare since
the beginning of the proxy War in Donetsk, up to and continuing through the official invasion of
Ukraine by uniformed members of the Russian Army in February 23, 2022. Putin has publicly
expressed that the goal of the war is regime change, although he has not ruled out occupation and
annexation.53 Kyrgyzstan represents a wealth of resources Russia hopes to continue to pull from,
including gold, coal, and uranium, as well as being a former Soviet possession, a status that has
shown to attract increased desire for control from Moscow. In addition, these states lack the
reprisal capabilities of the United States, especially in the worst-case scenario that a digital
conflict turns physical. Operations done against the United States are either conducted through
the cyber militia, who usually attack economic targets, such as the Yahoo! attacks, and through
delicate operations, done by the GRU’s experienced teams, against critical infrastructure and
political entities like the DNC. BlackEnergy’s deployment in American critical infrastructure
shows that the GRU is capable of playing the long game, with the intent to use that weapon in
the future if the necessity comes to it, and that it is capable of exercising restraint in its actions to
prevent accidental, further escalations of tensions.
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Therefore, it stands to reason that there is some line that acts as an estimated threshold for
active cyberweapon action against the United States. NATO has made clear as recently as
February 28, 2022 that it can and will trigger Article 5 of the NATO charter, the collective
defense clause, over a serious cyberattack against a member state54. Since NATO’s formation,
Article 5 has only been invoked once, in response to the terror attacks on 9/11. Although the
Article does not dictate military action, rather, only “…such action as it deems necessary,
including the use of armed force…”, the possibility of a coordinated cyber response represents
an equally powerful deterrent to the possibility of conventional conflicts, especially considering
such a response would include capabilities from the United States, United Kingdom, France,
Germany, and Estonia, all countries with highly sophisticated cyber capabilities that have been
developed and have rarely, if ever, been witnessed by the public or by an enemy55. In addition,
significant cyberoperations have the potential to escalate to physical, traditional conflict between
the adversaries, something which all parties involved in a possible cyberconflict are sure to be
aware of. Up to the present time, NATO has deliberately kept the threshold for the invocation of
Article 5 due to cyberattacks vague, merely stating that they much reach a sufficiently high bar.
For the United States, that threshold is exclusively up to the President and Congress, who have
no qualifiers on why a declaration of war might be made. Many institutions, such as the
Brookings Institute, have warned about the dangers of the United States being overzealous with
what it declares an act of war rather than an act of espionage, stating that by NATO’s own
research, gathered in the Tallinn Manual, a product named after the city in Estonia where the
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Bronze Soldier protests occurred, these are two distinct actions, and that elevating the fallout
from an act of espionage to be equivalent to that of an act of war would upend the current
international status quo.56
Based on all of this, I assess that due to there being no declared line in the sand that
would constitute a casus belli, Russia and the GRU will continue to probe the United States for
the foreseeable future with gradual cyberattacks, most, if not all, constituting acts of espionage.
The GRU will do so in both the traditional information theft approach, as well as laying
foundations for the future successors to BlackEnergy, exhibiting the same carefulness to ensure
the stability and safety of the weapons being deployed as they have previously. To engage in
large, decisive blows against the United States, in particular her critical infrastructure and
government, with little to no buildup in hostilities would have two consequences adverse to
Russian strategy. First, it would take time away from the GRU to perfect the development and
deployment of their weapons, something which has taken months to years in the past, in an effort
to avoid the notice of their actions. Second, it would cause undeniable and severe escalations,
would likely be considered an act of war, and has the potential to lead to a devastating conflict
between the United States and the Russian Federation.
Even in the event of cyberweapon deployment against the United States by Russia, they
will not come in a wave of hammer blows against critical infrastructure. Rather, Russia would
likely begin to deploy small warning strikes against the United States as geopolitical saber
rattling began to amplify to dangerous levels, hitting single power stations, banks, or government
agencies with disruption attacks. Examples of smaller strikes would include short term, localized
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disruptions in power and internet services, in the scale of a county or metroplex and smaller, as
well as targeted disruptions of financial services belonging to individual, but high profile, firms.
No destructive weaponry is likely to be utilized in this first wave of actions. These smaller
strikes would likely take place for no longer than a day before being relinquished, so as to be
seen as a capability demonstration rather than an attack. Should the tensions not be released,
Russia would likely follow up with small-scale destructive attacks, once again localized to single
targets, and with the elected precision that the current situation requires. Examples of these small
scale, destructive attacks include destructive attacks against data in financial firms in order to
severe disruption to its ability to facilitate the flow of capital. Against the power grid, destructive
attacks following disruption of the power grid on localized but high-profile targets, including
large American cities, are likely, hindering the ability to identify problems and respond in the
short term, and requiring replacement of machinery in the long term. Against ISPs, similar
attacks against the power grid, including destructive attacks targeting critical data coupled with
wider-scale disruptions, are highly likely, interrupting communications and services for at least a
day, potentially several. The scale of the destruction, however, would be localized, designed,
once again, to send a message rather than serve as a frontal assault against American critical
infrastructure. The disruptions would be on a larger scale than earlier attacks, and would likely
heavily outweigh the destructive nature of the second wave of attacks. To invoke an earlier
metaphor, the second wave of attacks would be the digital equivalent of precision guided
munitions, in contrast to the mass destruction caused by a weapon of at least NotPetya’s power.
These warning strike would likely continue up to and past the 11th hour, until the conflict is
resolved or it clears the last, final hurdle to an even greater conflict, which has the potential to
end in Russia utilizing its digital first-strike capabilities.
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Becoming a power in the realm of cyberconflict requires you to keep your cards intensely
close to your chest, and to be extremely deliberate in the usage of such weapons. In the
traditional sphere of weaponry, although a modern 500lb bomb might be more accurate, reliable,
and effective, a 500lb bomb from the Second World War will be capable of delivering similar, if
somewhat less effective, results. Seeing the detonation of a new bomb will not immediately
result in the adversary being able to copy it and utilize it against its inventor, nor will the usage
of this bomb suddenly make the inventor vulnerable to a new vector of attack. When looking at
cyberweapons, however, this is the reality that the United States, Russia, and other digital powers
face. To utilize a cyberweapon is to alert an enemy to a vulnerability that they might not have
been aware of, which is very likely to exist within targets in your own country. In addition, if the
attack is interrupted, witnessed, or if the victim manages to recover the malware utilized, it is
very likely that they attacker can become the attacked, as the initial victim will have the
capability to reverse engineer the weapon and turn it on its creator. As such, there is virtually no
information on Russia’s current suite of cyberweapons, and it is almost impossible to accurately
assess current Russian cybercapabilites without access to classified information; as such, we will
have to rely on tools which have been publicly dissected and documented.
First, a definition. This assessment defines “first strike” in the context of cyberattacks
between two nations as:
•

A large-scale attack against government, military, and civilian targets, with the particular
utilization of self-propagating malware designed for massive destruction of digital
information and of computers themselves, with the intent of debilitating a target’s
capability to resist, respond to, or engage in an active conflict, be it contained exclusively
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to cyberspace, engaged in a hybrid manner, or otherwise exclusively in a physical field of
battle.
•

This assessment is reluctant to place an explicit quantifier on the dollar amount of
destruction, number of organizations, devices, or people hit, or the precise scale of the
attack due to the ever-evolving nature of cyberwarfare, and, as such, elects to leave the
definition of “massive destruction” up to the determination of those engaged in the
potential conflict, a shortcoming which we recognize.

With that definition established and considered, it is highly likely that Russia has the
capability to develop first strike cyberweapons, based on the weapons and tools that have
come to public attention. A first strike weapon would likely be capable of considerably more
damage than NotPetya, and would have measures integrated into itself to prevent capture and
replication by the victim. I assess that it is likely that Russia is currently in possession in a
suite of first strike weapons, especially considering the dedication that the GRU has taken to
cyberoperations since 2010, the capabilities previously demonstrated, and the growing emphasis
on digital international confrontations. Finally, it is likely that Russia is currently exploring
the measures necessary to conduct a first strike operation against the United States, and
that there is a realistic probability that Russia is currently undergoing preliminary
operations to explore vulnerabilities to facilitate such an attack while not deploying a
payload on an American target, à la BlackEnergy’s initial steps in 2011.
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Chapter VI
An Assessment of Potential Use of Russian Cyberweapons Against the United States

To this point, this study has discussed the vulnerabilities found in American critical
infrastructure, and the weapons developed in the last two decades by the GRU, as well as our
assessment for the future of Russian capabilities. In this section, we will assess how the GRU
may deploy its array of capabilities against targets in various conditions.
The GRU is likely to continue to engage in continued espionage against institutions in the
American government and in the private sector, utilizing the skills and resources of Unit 54777,
Sandworm, and Fancy Bear, as well as their ‘cyber militia’, where the GRU rules in discretion’s
favor. It will do so to determine new vulnerabilities it can weaponize, both through active
experimentation and through the theft of designs and other trade secrets, as well as to gain access
to sensitive data, such as authentication data, which it can utilize in later exploits. In addition, the
GRU is likely to continue to engage in election interference against the United States, especially
through actions like those taken by Fancy Bear against the DNC, with the acquisition and
dissemination of potentially damaging documents and communications, as well as those of Unit
54777’s extensive disinformation campaigns. Finally, the GRU is likely to continue to engage in
continued and extensive operations with the purpose of undermining American confidence in the
nation’s institutions, with particular emphasis placed against American critical infrastructure,
judicial and legal systems, and the government as a whole, with the intent of dividing American
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resolve to come together in order to blunt the effectiveness of responses against extranational
threats, such as Russia.
Against American critical infrastructure, as stated before, it is within the realm of realistic
probability that the GRU is currently engaged in forward probing and deployment of
cyberweapons with the intent to destroy or disrupt American critical infrastructure. It is an
almost certainty that the GRU has developed weapons that are similar to or enhancements of
BlackEnergy or NotPetya, and as such, any weapon deployed would have the capability to avoid
binary scanners and other fingerprint tools within the CVE database, which is used as a reference
for any automated tool utilized to check for the installation of known malware on a machine.
BlackEnergy was likely laying the groundwork for the for a localized disruption of American
electrical supply as a result of future escalating confrontations, and it is a realistic probability that
it could have caused a widespread disruption. Having been caught on American systems in 2014
and utilizing BlackEnergy against Ukrainian systems in 2015, the GRU is almost certain to be
aware that there is a heightened alertness for the deployment of these or similar systems on
critical infrastructure. However, the GRU is also almost certainly aware that ICS systems have a
history of being poorly monitored for breaches, and that if a successful infiltration occurs, they
likely have at least six months to deploy software before their activities are noticed, especially if
the installed malware is effective, condensed, and efficient. Because of all of these factors, I
assess that the GRU is currently engaged in forward proving and deployment of such
cyberweapons, and that it is highly likely that if they are not, the GRU is in the planning stages
of such an operation for the future.
Furthermore, I would like to assess what we believe to be the Most Likely, Most
Dangerous, and Worst Case scenarios that could occur as a result of GRU cyberoperations
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against American targets. These are theoretical scenarios that I assess to be the best descriptors
of the answer to our intelligence question – that is, what a deployment of Russian cyberweapons
against American critical infrastructure would be, and are detailed as such below.
•

Most Likely – I assess that the most likely scenario of Russian cyberweapon deployment
against American critical infrastructure would be localized disruption attacks, facilitated
by unauthorized control attacks, against power providers and ISPs, as well as disruptive
and information extraction attacks against financial services. These attacks would cause a
short to moderate breakdown of public services and order in areas where the systems,
especially power, are attacked, dependent on the downtime of the affected systems. Long
term effects of the attack include the potential for large amounts of sensitive information
belonging to American citizens being disseminated online - such as emails, passwords,
dates of birth, full names, social security numbers, and financial and medical information,
a drop in American citizen’s confidence in the present government, and a large
consumption of resources in critical infrastructure associated with recovery, assessment,
and preventative measures surrounding the attack. Such an attack would likely be a part
of geopolitical escalations, such as sharp sanctions against Russian entities by the US and
her allies or a further expansion of NATO into territory which Russia deems to be under
its sphere of influence. While a shock to Americans, the attack would likely be conducted
potentially through assets, including the cyber militia, for operational deniability, be
conducted with the GRU operating with a mask of another APT or hostile actor present in
order to cause misattribution, or with extreme discipline to prevent attribution altogether,
whichever the GRU assesses will be the most beneficial to its operation. In addition,
although significant steps will be very likely taken to obfuscate accurate attribution, the
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GRU is almost certain to conduct the operation on the scale that it assesses will not be
sufficient to prompt American response at a detrimental level, especially traditional
means of conflict. Rather, it will likely be a measured strike invoked by the GRU in an
effort to push the United States off balance, distracting public and official focus from the
rising tensions in order to for Russia to regain the upper hand, while limiting responses to
the cyber and political landscape, with expectation for further, survivable sanctions
included. However, having viewed the response to operations it has conducted on foreign
soil, notably the assassination attempts of former Russian intelligence officials who have
defected to the West, namely Alexander Litvinenko (who perished in the attempt,
involving lethal radiation poisoning) and Sergei Skripal (who survived poisoning with the
nerve agent Novichuk), will very likely feel confident that the ability to deny operations
in the face of evidence will help to mitigate severe repercussions against Russia.
•

Most Dangerous – The most dangerous attack that the GRU could undertake against
American critical infrastructure would be the wide-scale deployment of self-replicating
destructive cyberweaponry, augmented by unauthorized control and information
extraction modules, against numerous American critical infrastructure installations. Such
an attack would likely result in the prolonged collapse of major columns of modern life,
with long-enduring power blackouts, communication dead zones, and a lack of financial
stability, which would almost certainly have severe, negative effects on the economy’s
integrity and on the average civilian’s capability to purchase necessary supplies,
including food and gas, as the aftermath settles. In addition, numerous casualties,
including hundreds, if not thousands, of deaths could be attributed to the attack, based on
casualty reports from the 2003 Northeast Blackout, although that number will vary
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according to the metrics employed57. Depending on the scale of the attack, this could be
isolated to several major metroplexes, the majority of a state – especially if it is densely
populated, or further expanses. The area of the damage, especially against power systems,
depends on how the system is attacked, as a well-coordinated assault against the power
grid has the potential to create power surges and other phenomena within the grid,
amplifying the damage it creates. This action would very likely be a final act before a
traditional armed conflict, and would likely follow a previous armed skirmish, possibly
due to a US/NATO intervention in a country in Eastern Europe, or another action viewed
as provocative by Russia. With an operation of this scale, it is improbable that the GRU
would be able to conceal the true actor in such a strike, and as such, Russia would
possibly deny the action, or would use it after invoking a casus belli. An attack of this
scale would very likely meet the qualifications for a First Strike, and if attribution was
placed on the Russian Federation, would almost certainly constitute a casus belli itself for
an American declaration of war, very likely referred to as a ‘Digital Pearl Harbor’. As
such, this action would be very unlikely, and would constitute a last-ditch effort by
Russia in the face of ongoing escalation and the early stages of a conflict.
•

Worst Case – The worst case scenario of a cyberattack by the GRU on American targets
would be the very remote chance of a coordinated First Strike against targets in the
United States, utilizing methods discussed in the Most Dangerous case, in order
exacerbate an ongoing crisis, whether it be a natural disaster, the outbreak of an armed
conflict, or a period of social unrest within the United States. This attack would almost
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certainly disrupt any coordinated response or recovery efforts to the ongoing crisis,
resulting in increased casualties, infrastructure damage, and economic disruption, as well
as inheriting the previously discussed impacts of the Most Dangerous case. Ultimately,
this attack is a Most Dangerous, but executed in a specific timeframe to amplify the
damage dealt, and cripple American response capability in the short term.

These assessments ultimately lead to the consideration the possibility of a Russian
cyberweapon First Strike against American critical infrastructure. I assess that it is an almost
certainty that the GRU is exploring the possibility of developing a First Strike weapon, even if
they have no immediate plans to deploy it. I assess that this is out of a theory of digital
deterrence, in an effort to protect against the very likely Russian fear of a First Strike from
NATO, which Putin very likely views as an imminent threat to his power. However, the
probability that a First Strike cyberweapon is ever deployed at its full scale, by Russia or NATO,
is a remote chance, due to the danger that originates from the political fallout, and the potential
for armed conflict as a result. However, the fallout from the deployment of lesser cyberweapon,
within the order of magnitude of NotPetya, a digital ‘bombing campaign’, and lower, are within
the realm of probability that Russia could deploy them against American targets should tensions
become high enough. I have previously seen the confidence of the GRU in hitting American
targets with cyberattacks, and coupled with their skill, the inherent difficulty in aggressor
attribution in cybersecurity, and the capability to utilize elements of the cyber militia, I assess
that the GRU will almost certainly retain and actively utilize cyberweaponry against the United
States in the next five years, attacking critical infrastructure, industry, and government targets for
various motivations.
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Due to all previously cited materials and assessments, I assess that Russia is highly likely
to utilize cyberweaponry against American critical infrastructure if its own intelligence comes to
the assessment that doing so would further Russian geopolitical ambitions, especially in times of
heightened tensions, either as a warning sign, an effort at subterfuge and disruption, or as an
early digital skirmish as tensions begin to boil over. The size, duration, effectiveness, and targets
of the attacks are dependent on Russian strategic goals, the tools utilized, and the vulnerabilities
currently present in targeted systems, but the most significant targets within American critical
infrastructure, I assess, are the power grid, financial sector, and telecommunications industry,
especially due to the repercussions if these sectors would be negatively impacted by an attack by
Russian cyberweapons.
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